OID: {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-6(6)} @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std 1609.2 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2.
Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} WITH SUCCESSORS
EtsiTs103097ExtensionModule {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) secHeaders(103097) extension(2) major-version-1(1) minor-version-0(0)} WITH SUCCESSORS
This data type is used to contain the other data types in this clause. The fields in the Ieee1609Dot2Data have the following meanings:
@note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to the Ieee1609Dot2Content.
Fields:
protocolVersion Uint8 (3)
contains the current version of the protocol. The
version specified in this standard is version 3, represented by the
integer 3. There are no major or minor version numbers.
content Ieee1609Dot2Content
contains the content in the form of an Ieee1609Dot2Content.
Ieee1609Dot2Data ::= SEQUENCE {protocolVersion Uint8(3),content Ieee1609Dot2Content}
In this structure:
@note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it is of type signedData. The canonicalization applies to the SignedData.
Fields:
unsecuredData Opaque
indicates that the content is an OCTET STRING to be
consumed outside the SDS.
signedData SignedData
indicates that the content has been signed according to
this standard.
encryptedData EncryptedData
indicates that the content has been encrypted
according to this standard.
signedCertificateRequest Opaque
indicates that the content is a
certificate request signed by an IEEE 1609.2 certificate or self-signed.
signedX509CertificateRequest Opaque
indicates that the content is a
certificate request signed by an ITU-T X.509 certificate.
Ieee1609Dot2Content ::= CHOICE {unsecuredData Opaque,signedData SignedData,encryptedData EncryptedData,signedCertificateRequest Opaque,...,signedX509CertificateRequest Opaque}
In this structure:
@note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to the ToBeSignedData and the Signature.
Fields:
hashId HashAlgorithm
indicates the hash algorithm to be used to generate the hash
of the message for signing and verification.
tbsData ToBeSignedData
contains the data that is hashed as input to the signature.
signer SignerIdentifier
determines the keying material and hash algorithm used to
sign the data.
signature Signature
contains the digital signature itself, calculated as
specified in 5.3.1.
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {hashId HashAlgorithm,tbsData ToBeSignedData,signer SignerIdentifier,signature Signature}
This structure contains the data to be hashed when generating or verifying a signature. See 6.3.4 for the specification of the input to the hash.
@note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to the SignedDataPayload if it is of type data, and to the HeaderInfo.
Fields:
payload SignedDataPayload
contains data that is provided by the entity that invokes
the SDS.
headerInfo HeaderInfo
contains additional data that is inserted by the SDS.
This structure is used as follows to determine the "data input" to the
hash operation for signing or verification as specified in 5.3.1.2.2 or
5.3.1.3.
ToBeSignedData ::= SEQUENCE {payload SignedDataPayload,headerInfo HeaderInfo}
This structure contains the data payload of a ToBeSignedData. This structure contains at least one of the optional elements, and may contain more than one. See 5.2.4.3.4 for more details. The security profile in Annex C allows an implementation of this standard to state which forms of Signed¬Data¬Payload are supported by that implementation, and also how the signer and verifier are intended to obtain the external data for hashing. The specification of an SDEE that uses external data is expected to be explicit and unambiguous about how this data is obtained and how it is formatted prior to processing by the hash function.
@note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to the Ieee1609Dot2Data.
Fields:
data Ieee1609Dot2Data OPTIONAL
contains data that is explicitly transported within the
structure.
extDataHash HashedData OPTIONAL
contains the hash of data that is not explicitly
transported within the structure, and which the creator of the structure
wishes to cryptographically bind to the signature.
omitted NULL OPTIONAL
indicates that there is external data to be included in the
hash calculation for the signature.The mechanism for including the external
data in the hash calculation is specified in 6.3.6.
SignedDataPayload ::= SEQUENCE {data Ieee1609Dot2Data OPTIONAL,extDataHash HashedData OPTIONAL,...,omitted NULL OPTIONAL} (WITH COMPONENTS {..., data PRESENT} |WITH COMPONENTS {..., extDataHash PRESENT} |WITH COMPONENTS {..., omitted PRESENT})
This structure contains the hash of some data with a specified hash algorithm. See 5.3.3 for specification of the permitted hash algorithms.
@note Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.
Fields:
sha256HashedData HashedId32
indicates data hashed with SHA-256.
sha384HashedData HashedId48
indicates data hashed with SHA-384.
sm3HashedData HashedId32
indicates data hashed with SM3.
HashedData::= CHOICE {sha256HashedData HashedId32,...,sha384HashedData HashedId48,sm3HashedData HashedId32}
This structure contains information that is used to establish validity by the criteria of 5.2.
@note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to the EncryptionKey. If encryptionKey is present, and indicates the choice public, and contains a BasePublicEncryptionKey that is an elliptic curve point (i.e., of type EccP256CurvePoint or EccP384CurvePoint), then the elliptic curve point is encoded in compressed form, i.e., such that the choice indicated within the Ecc*CurvePoint is compressed-y-0 or compressed-y-1. The canonicalization does not apply to any fields after the extension marker, including any fields in contributedExtensions.
Fields:
psid Psid
indicates the application area with which the sender is
claiming the payload is to be associated.
generationTime Time64 OPTIONAL
indicates the time at which the structure was
generated. See 5.2.5.2.2 and 5.2.5.2.3 for discussion of the use of this
field.
expiryTime Time64 OPTIONAL
if present, contains the time after which the data
is no longer considered relevant. If both generationTime and
expiryTime are present, the signed SPDU is invalid if generationTime is
not strictly earlier than expiryTime.
generationLocation ThreeDLocation OPTIONAL
if present, contains the location at which the
signature was generated.
p2pcdLearningRequest HashedId3 OPTIONAL
if present, is used by the SDS to request
certificates for which it has seen identifiers and does not know the
entire certificate. A specification of this peer-to-peer certificate
distribution (P2PCD) mechanism is given in Clause 8. This field is used
for the separate-certificate-pdu flavor of P2PCD and shall only be present
if inlineP2pcdRequest is not present. The HashedId3 is calculated with the
whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as described in 6.4.3,
applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized as defined in the
definition of Certificate.
missingCrlIdentifier MissingCrlIdentifier OPTIONAL
if present, is used by the SDS to request
CRLs which it knows to have been issued and have not received. This is
provided for future use and the associated mechanism is not defined in
this version of this standard.
encryptionKey EncryptionKey OPTIONAL
if present, is used to provide a key that is to
be used to encrypt at least one response to this SPDU. The SDEE
specification is expected to specify which response SPDUs are to be
encrypted with this key. One possible use of this key to encrypt a
response is specified in 6.3.35, 6.3.37, and 6.3.34. An encryptionKey
field of type symmetric should only be used if the SignedData containing
this field is securely encrypted by some means.
inlineP2pcdRequest SequenceOfHashedId3 OPTIONAL
if present, is used by the SDS to request
unknown certificates per the inline peer-to-peer certificate distribution
mechanism is given in Clause 8. This field shall only be present if
p2pcdLearningRequest is not present. The HashedId3 is calculated with the
whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as described in 6.4.3, applied
to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized as defined in the definition
of Certificate.
requestedCertificate Certificate OPTIONAL
if present, is used by the SDS to provide
certificates per the "inline" version of the peer-to-peer certificate
distribution mechanism given in Clause 8.
pduFunctionalType PduFunctionalType OPTIONAL
if present, is used to indicate that the SPDU is
to be consumed by a process other than an application process as defined
in ISO 21177 [B14a]. See 6.3.23b for more details.
contributedExtensions ContributedExtensionBlocks OPTIONAL
if present, is used to contain additional
extensions defined using the ContributedExtensionBlocks structure.
HeaderInfo ::= SEQUENCE {psid Psid,generationTime Time64 OPTIONAL,expiryTime Time64 OPTIONAL,generationLocation ThreeDLocation OPTIONAL,p2pcdLearningRequest HashedId3 OPTIONAL,missingCrlIdentifier MissingCrlIdentifier OPTIONAL,encryptionKey EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,...,inlineP2pcdRequest SequenceOfHashedId3 OPTIONAL,requestedCertificate Certificate OPTIONAL,pduFunctionalType PduFunctionalType OPTIONAL,contributedExtensions ContributedExtensionBlocks OPTIONAL}
This structure may be used to request a CRL that the SSME knows to have been issued and has not yet received. It is provided for future use and its use is not defined in this version of this standard.
Fields:
cracaId HashedId3
is the HashedId3 of the CRACA, as defined in 5.1.3. The
HashedId3 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm,
determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate,
canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate.
crlSeries CrlSeries
is the requested CRL Series value. See 5.1.3 for more
information.
MissingCrlIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {cracaId HashedId3,crlSeries CrlSeries,...}
This data structure identifies the functional entity that is intended to consume an SPDU, for the case where that functional entity is not an application process, and are instead security support services for an application process. Further details and the intended use of this field are defined in ISO 21177 [B20].
PduFunctionalType ::= INTEGER (0..255)
tlsHandshake PduFunctionalType ::= 1iso21177ExtendedAuth PduFunctionalType ::= 2iso21177SessionExtension PduFunctionalType ::= 3
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
ContributedExtensionBlocks ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OFContributedExtensionBlock
This data structure defines the format of an extension block provided by an identified contributor by using the temnplate provided in the class IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION constraint to the objects in the set Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions.
Values:
contributorId IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION .&id({
Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions
})
uniquely identifies the contributor.
extns SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF
contains a list of extensions from that contributor.
Extensions are expected and not required to follow the format specified
in 6.5.
Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions }{@.contributorId})
ContributedExtensionBlock ::= SEQUENCE {contributorId IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION.&id({Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions}),extns SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OFIEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION.&Extn({Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions}{@.contributorId})}
This Information Object Class defines the class that provides a template for defining extension blocks.
IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION ::= CLASS {&id HeaderInfoContributorId UNIQUE,&Extn} WITH SYNTAX {&Extn IDENTIFIED BY &id}
This structure is an ASN.1 Information Object Set listing the defined contributed extension types and the associated HeaderInfoContributorId values. In this version of this standard two extension types are defined: Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension and EtsiOriginatingHeaderInfoExtension.
Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensionsIEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION ::= {{Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension IDENTIFIED BYieee1609HeaderInfoContributorId} |{EtsiOriginatingHeaderInfoExtension IDENTIFIED BYetsiHeaderInfoContributorId},...}
This is an integer used to identify a HeaderInfo extension contributing organization. In this version of this standard two values are defined:
HeaderInfoContributorId ::= INTEGER (0..255)
ieee1609HeaderInfoContributorId HeaderInfoContributorId ::= 1etsiHeaderInfoContributorId HeaderInfoContributorId ::= 2
This structure allows the recipient of data to determine which keying material to use to authenticate the data. It also indicates the verification type to be used to generate the hash for verification, as specified in 5.3.1.
@note Critical information fields:
If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not recognize the CHOICE value for this type when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid.
If present, certificate is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not support the number of certificates in certificate when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid. A compliant implementation shall support certificate fields containing at least one certificate.
@note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to every Certificate in the certificate field.
Fields:
digest HashedId8
If the choice indicated is digest:
certificate SequenceOfCertificate
If the choice indicated is certificate:
self NULL
If the choice indicated is self:
SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {digest HashedId8,certificate SequenceOfCertificate,self NULL,...}
This data structure is used to perform a countersignature over an already-signed SPDU. This is the profile of an Ieee1609Dot2Data containing a signedData. The tbsData within content is composed of a payload containing the hash (extDataHash) of the externally generated, pre-signed SPDU over which the countersignature is performed.
Countersignature ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,content (WITH COMPONENTS {...,signedData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,payload (WITH COMPONENTS {...,data ABSENT,extDataHash PRESENT}),headerInfo(WITH COMPONENTS {...,generationTime PRESENT,expiryTime ABSENT,generationLocation ABSENT,p2pcdLearningRequest ABSENT,missingCrlIdentifier ABSENT,encryptionKey ABSENT})})})})})
This data structure encodes data that has been encrypted to one or more recipients using the recipients’ public or symmetric keys as specified in 5.3.4.
@note Critical information fields:
If present, recipients is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not support the number of RecipientInfo in recipients when decrypted shall indicate that the encrypted SPDU could not be decrypted due to unsupported critical information fields. A compliant implementation shall support recipients fields containing at least eight entries.
@note If the plaintext is raw data, i.e., it has not been output from a previous operation of the SDS, then it is trivial to encapsulate it in an Ieee1609Dot2Data of type unsecuredData as noted in 4.2.2.2.2. For example, '03 80 08 01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF' is the C-OER encoding of '01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF' encapsulated in an Ieee1609Dot2Data of type unsecuredData. The first byte of the encoding 03 is the protocolVersion, the second byte 80 indicates the choice unsecuredData, and the third byte 08 is the length of the raw data '01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF'.
Fields:
recipients SequenceOfRecipientInfo
contains one or more RecipientInfos. These entries may
be more than one RecipientInfo, and more than one type of RecipientInfo,
as long as all entries are indicating or containing the same data encryption
key.
ciphertext SymmetricCiphertext
contains the encrypted data. This is the encryption of
an encoded Ieee1609Dot2Data structure as specified in 5.3.4.2.
EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE {recipients SequenceOfRecipientInfo,ciphertext SymmetricCiphertext}
This data structure is used to transfer the data encryption key to an individual recipient of an EncryptedData. The option pskRecipInfo is selected if the EncryptedData was encrypted using the static encryption key approach specified in 5.3.4. The other options are selected if the EncryptedData was encrypted using the ephemeral encryption key approach specified in 5.3.4. The meanings of the choices are:
See Annex C.7 for guidance on when it may be appropriate to use each of these approaches.
@note If the encryption algorithm is SM2, there is no equivalent of the parameter P1 and so no input to the encryption process that uses the hash of the certificate.
@note If the encryption algorithm is SM2, there is no equivalent of the parameter P1 and so no input to the encryption process that uses the hash of the Ieee1609Dot2Data.
@note If the encryption algorithm is SM2, there is no equivalent of the parameter P1 and so no input to the encryption process that uses the hash of the empty string.
@note The material input to encryption is the bytes of the encryption key with no headers, encapsulation, or length indication. Contrast this to encryption of data, where the data is encapsulated in an Ieee1609Dot2Data.
Fields:
pskRecipInfo PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo
The data was encrypted directly using a pre-shared
symmetric key.
symmRecipInfo SymmRecipientInfo
The data was encrypted with a data encryption key,
and the data encryption key was encrypted using a symmetric key.
certRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo
The data was encrypted with a data encryption key,
the data encryption key was encrypted using a public key encryption scheme,
where the public encryption key was obtained from a certificate. In this
case, the parameter P1 to ECIES as defined in 5.3.5 is the hash of the
certificate, calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm,
determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate,
canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate.
signedDataRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo
The data was encrypted with a data encryption
key, the data encryption key was encrypted using a public key encryption
scheme, where the public encryption key was obtained as the public response
encryption key from a SignedData. In this case, if ECIES is the encryption
algorithm, then the parameter P1 to ECIES as defined in 5.3.5 is the
SHA-256 hash of the Ieee1609Dot2Data of type signedData containing the
response encryption key, canonicalized as defined in the definition of
Ieee1609Dot2Data.
rekRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo
The data was encrypted with a data encryption key,
the data encryption key was encrypted using a public key encryption scheme,
where the public encryption key was not obtained from a Signed-Data or a
certificate. In this case, the SDEE specification is expected to specify
how the public key is obtained, and if ECIES is the encryption algorithm,
then the parameter P1 to ECIES as defined in 5.3.5 is the hash of the
empty string.
RecipientInfo ::= CHOICE {pskRecipInfo PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo,symmRecipInfo SymmRecipientInfo,certRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo,signedDataRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo,rekRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo}
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
SequenceOfRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE OF RecipientInfo
This data structure is used to indicate a symmetric key that may be used directly to decrypt a SymmetricCiphertext. It consists of the low-order 8 bytes of the hash of the COER encoding of a SymmetricEncryptionKey structure containing the symmetric key in question. The HashedId8 is calculated with the hash algorithm determined as specified in 5.3.9.3. The symmetric key may be established by any appropriate means agreed by the two parties to the exchange.
PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo ::= HashedId8
This data structure contains the following fields:
Fields:
recipientId HashedId8
contains the hash of the symmetric key encryption key
that may be used to decrypt the data encryption key. It consists of the
low-order 8 bytes of the hash of the COER encoding of a
SymmetricEncryptionKey structure containing the symmetric key in question.
The HashedId8 is calculated with the hash algorithm determined as
specified in 5.3.9.4. The symmetric key may be established by any
appropriate means agreed by the two parties to the exchange.
encKey SymmetricCiphertext
contains the encrypted data encryption key within a
SymmetricCiphertext, where the data encryption key is input to the data
encryption key encryption process with no headers, encapsulation, or
length indication.
SymmRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {recipientId HashedId8,encKey SymmetricCiphertext}
This data structure contains the following fields:
Fields:
recipientId HashedId8
contains the hash of the container for the encryption
public key as specified in the definition of RecipientInfo. Specifically,
depending on the choice indicated by the containing RecipientInfo structure:
encKey EncryptedDataEncryptionKey
contains the encrypted data encryption key, where the data
encryption key is input to the data encryption key encryption process with
no headers, encapsulation, or length indication.
PKRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {recipientId HashedId8,encKey EncryptedDataEncryptionKey}
This data structure contains an encrypted data encryption key, where the data encryption key is input to the data encryption key encryption process with no headers, encapsulation, or length indication.
Critical information fields: If present and applicable to the receiving SDEE, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. If an implementation receives an encrypted SPDU and determines that one or more RecipientInfo fields are relevant to it, and if all of those RecipientInfos contain an EncryptedDataEncryptionKey such that the implementation does not recognize the indicated CHOICE, the implementation shall indicate that the encrypted SPDU is not decryptable.
Fields:
EncryptedDataEncryptionKey ::= CHOICE {eciesNistP256 EciesP256EncryptedKey,eciesBrainpoolP256r1 EciesP256EncryptedKey,...,ecencSm2256 EcencP256EncryptedKey}
This data structure encapsulates a ciphertext generated with an approved symmetric algorithm.
@note Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not recognize the indicated CHOICE value for this type in an encrypted SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.
Fields:
SymmetricCiphertext ::= CHOICE {aes128ccm One28BitCcmCiphertext,...,sm4Ccm One28BitCcmCiphertext}
This data structure encapsulates an encrypted ciphertext for any symmetric algorithm with 128-bit blocks in CCM mode. The ciphertext is 16 bytes longer than the corresponding plaintext due to the inclusion of the message authentication code (MAC). The plaintext resulting from a correct decryption of the ciphertext is either a COER-encoded Ieee1609Dot2Data structure (see 6.3.41), or a 16-byte symmetric key (see 6.3.44).
The ciphertext is 16 bytes longer than the corresponding plaintext.
The plaintext resulting from a correct decryption of the ciphertext is a COER-encoded Ieee1609Dot2Data structure.
@note In the name of this structure, "One28" indicates that the symmetric cipher block size is 128 bits. It happens to also be the case that the keys used for both AES-128-CCM and SM4-CCM are also 128 bits long. This is, however, not what “One28” refers to. Since the cipher is used in counter mode, i.e., as a stream cipher, the fact that that block size is 128 bits affects only the size of the MAC and does not affect the size of the raw ciphertext.
Fields:
nonce OCTET STRING (SIZE (12))
contains the nonce N as specified in 5.3.8.
ccmCiphertext Opaque
contains the ciphertext C as specified in 5.3.8.
One28BitCcmCiphertext ::= SEQUENCE {nonce OCTET STRING (SIZE (12)),ccmCiphertext Opaque}
This type is defined only for backwards compatibility.
Aes128CcmCiphertext ::= One28BitCcmCiphertext
This structure is a profile of the structure CertificateBase which specifies the valid combinations of fields to transmit implicit and explicit certificates.
@note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to the CertificateBase.
TestCertificate ::= Certificate
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
SequenceOfCertificate ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate
The fields in this structure have the following meaning:
@note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to the ToBeSignedCertificate and to the Signature.
@note Whole-certificate hash: If the entirety of a certificate is hashed to calculate a HashedId3, HashedId8, or HashedId10, the algorithm used for this purpose is known as the whole-certificate hash. The method used to determine the whole-certificate hash algorithm is specified in 5.3.9.2.
Fields:
version Uint8 (3)
contains the version of the certificate format. In this
version of the data structures, this field is set to 3.
type CertificateType
states whether the certificate is implicit or explicit. This
field is set to explicit for explicit certificates and to implicit for
implicit certificates. See ExplicitCertificate and ImplicitCertificate for
more details.
issuer IssuerIdentifier
identifies the issuer of the certificate.
toBeSigned ToBeSignedCertificate
is the certificate contents. This field is an input to
the hash when generating or verifying signatures for an explicit
certificate, or generating or verifying the public key from the
reconstruction value for an implicit certificate. The details of how this
field are encoded are given in the description of the
ToBeSignedCertificate type.
signature Signature OPTIONAL
is included in an ExplicitCertificate. It is the
signature, calculated by the signer identified in the issuer field, over
the hash of toBeSigned. The hash is calculated as specified in 5.3.1, where:
CertificateBase ::= SEQUENCE {version Uint8(3),type CertificateType,issuer IssuerIdentifier,toBeSigned ToBeSignedCertificate,signature Signature OPTIONAL}
This enumerated type indicates whether a certificate is explicit or implicit.
@note Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.5. An implementation that does not recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.
CertificateType ::= ENUMERATED {explicit,implicit,...}
This is a profile of the CertificateBase structure providing all the fields necessary for an implicit certificate, and no others.
ImplicitCertificate ::= CertificateBase (WITH COMPONENTS {...,type(implicit),toBeSigned(WITH COMPONENTS {...,verifyKeyIndicator(WITH COMPONENTS {reconstructionValue})}),signature ABSENT})
This is a profile of the CertificateBase structure providing all the fields necessary for an explicit certificate, and no others.
ExplicitCertificate ::= CertificateBase (WITH COMPONENTS {...,type(explicit),toBeSigned (WITH COMPONENTS {...,verifyKeyIndicator(WITH COMPONENTS {verificationKey})}),signature PRESENT})
This structure allows the recipient of a certificate to determine which keying material to use to authenticate the certificate.
If the choice indicated is sha256AndDigest, sha384AndDigest, or sm3AndDigest:
The structure contains the HashedId8 of the issuing certificate. The HashedId8 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate.
The hash algorithm to be used to generate the hash of the certificate for verification is SHA-256 (in the case of sha256AndDigest), SM3 (in the case of sm3AndDigest) or SHA-384 (in the case of sha384AndDigest).
The certificate is to be verified with the public key of the indicated issuing certificate.
If the choice indicated is self:
The structure indicates what hash algorithm is to be used to generate the hash of the certificate for verification.
The certificate is to be verified with the public key indicated by the verifyKeyIndicator field in theToBeSignedCertificate.
@note Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.5. An implementation that does not recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.
Fields:
IssuerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {sha256AndDigest HashedId8,self HashAlgorithm,...,sha384AndDigest HashedId8,sm3AndDigest HashedId8}
The fields in the ToBeSignedCertificate structure have the following meaning:
For both implicit and explicit certificates, when the certificate is hashed to create or recover the public key (in the case of an implicit certificate) or to generate or verify the signature (in the case of an explicit certificate), the hash is Hash (Data input) || Hash ( Signer identifier input), where:
Data input is the COER encoding of toBeSigned, canonicalized as described above.
Signer identifier input depends on the verification type, which in turn depends on the choice indicated by issuer. If the choice indicated by issuer is self, the verification type is self-signed and the signer identifier input is the empty string. If the choice indicated by issuer is not self, the verification type is certificate and the signer identifier input is the COER encoding of the canonicalization per 6.4.3 of the certificate indicated by issuer.
In other words, for implicit certificates, the value H (CertU) in SEC 4, section 3, is for purposes of this standard taken to be H [H (canonicalized ToBeSignedCertificate from the subordinate certificate) || H (entirety of issuer Certificate)]. See 5.3.2 for further discussion, including material differences between this standard and SEC 4 regarding how the hash function output is converted from a bit string to an integer.
@note usesCubk is only relevant for CA certificates, and the only functionality defined associated with this field is associated with consistency checks on received certificate responses. No functionality associated with communications between peer SDEEs is defined associated with this field.
@note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to the PublicEncryptionKey and to the VerificationKeyIndicator.
If the PublicEncryptionKey contains a BasePublicEncryptionKey that is an elliptic curve point (i.e., of type EccP256CurvePoint or EccP384CurvePoint), then the elliptic curve point is encoded in compressed form, i.e., such that the choice indicated within the Ecc*CurvePoint is compressed-y-0 or compressed-y-1.
@note Critical information fields:
If present, appPermissions is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. If an implementation of verification does not support the number of PsidSsp in the appPermissions field of a certificate that signed a signed SPDU, that implementation shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.. A conformant implementation shall support appPermissions fields containing at least eight entries. It may be the case that an implementation of verification does not support the number of entries in the appPermissions field and the appPermissions field is not relevant to the verification: this will occur, for example, if the certificate in question is a CA certificate and so the certIssuePermissions field is relevant to the verification and the appPermissions field is not. In this case, whether the implementation indicates that the signed SPDU is valid (because it could validate all relevant fields) or invalid (because it could not parse the entire certificate) is implementation-specific.
If present, certIssuePermissions is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. If an implementation of verification does not support the number of PsidGroupPermissions in the certIssuePermissions field of a CA certificate in the chain of a signed SPDU, the implementation shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established. A conformant implementation shall support certIssuePermissions fields containing at least eight entries. It may be the case that an implementation of verification does not support the number of entries in the certIssuePermissions field and the certIssuePermissions field is not relevant to the verification: this will occur, for example, if the certificate in question is the signing certificate for the SPDU and so the appPermissions field is relevant to the verification and the certIssuePermissions field is not. In this case, whether the implementation indicates that the signed SPDU is valid (because it could validate all relevant fields) or invalid (because it could not parse the entire certificate) is implementation-specific.
If present, certRequestPermissions is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. If an implementaiton of verification of a certificate request does not support the number of PsidGroupPermissions in certRequestPermissions, the implementation shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established. A conformant implementation shall support certRequestPermissions fields containing at least eight entries. It may be the case that an implementation of verification does not support the number of entries in the certRequestPermissions field and the certRequestPermissions field is not relevant to the verification: this will occur, for example, if the certificate in question is the signing certificate for the SPDU and so the appPermissions field is relevant to the verification and the certRequestPermissions field is not. In this case, whether the implementation indicates that the signed SPDU is valid (because it could validate all relevant fields) or invalid (because it could not parse the entire certificate) is implementation-specific.
Fields:
id CertificateId
contains information that is used to identify the certificate
holder if necessary.
cracaId HashedId3
identifies the Certificate Revocation Authorization CA
(CRACA) responsible for certificate revocation lists (CRLs) on which this
certificate might appear. Use of the cracaId is specified in 5.1.3. The
HashedId3 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm,
determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate,
canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate.
crlSeries CrlSeries
represents the CRL series relevant to a particular
Certificate Revocation Authorization CA (CRACA) on which the certificate
might appear. Use of this field is specified in 5.1.3.
validityPeriod ValidityPeriod
contains the validity period of the certificate.
region GeographicRegion OPTIONAL
if present, indicates the validity region of the
certificate. If it is omitted the validity region is indicated as follows:
assuranceLevel SubjectAssurance OPTIONAL
indicates the assurance level of the certificate
holder.
appPermissions SequenceOfPsidSsp OPTIONAL
indicates the permissions that the certificate
holder has to sign application data with this certificate. A valid
instance of appPermissions contains any particular Psid value in at most
one entry.
certIssuePermissions SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions OPTIONAL
indicates the permissions that the certificate
holder has to sign certificates with this certificate. A valid instance of
this array contains no more than one entry whose psidSspRange field
indicates all. If the array has multiple entries and one entry has its
psidSspRange field indicate all, then the entry indicating all specifies
the permissions for all PSIDs other than the ones explicitly specified in
the other entries. See the description of PsidGroupPermissions for further
discussion.
certRequestPermissions SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions OPTIONAL
indicates the permissions that the
certificate holder can request in its certificate. A valid instance of this
array contains no more than one entry whose psidSspRange field indicates
all. If the array has multiple entries and one entry has its psidSspRange
field indicate all, then the entry indicating all specifies the permissions
for all PSIDs other than the ones explicitly specified in the other entries.
See the description of PsidGroupPermissions for further discussion.
canRequestRollover NULL OPTIONAL
indicates that the certificate may be used to
sign a request for another certificate with the same permissions. This
field is provided for future use and its use is not defined in this
version of this standard.
encryptionKey PublicEncryptionKey OPTIONAL
contains a public key for encryption for which the
certificate holder holds the corresponding private key.
verifyKeyIndicator VerificationKeyIndicator
contains material that may be used to recover
the public key that may be used to verify data signed by this certificate.
flags BIT STRING {usesCubk (0)} (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL
indicates additional yes/no properties of the certificate
holder. The only bit with defined semantics in this string in this version
of this standard is usesCubk. If set, the usesCubk bit indicates that the
certificate holder supports the compact unified butterfly key response.
Further material about the compact unified butterfly key response can be
found in IEEE Std 1609.2.1.
appExtensions SequenceOfAppExtensions
indicates additional permissions that may be applied
to application activities that the certificate holder is carrying out.
certIssueExtensions SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions
indicates additional permissions to issue
certificates containing endEntityExtensions.
certRequestExtension SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions
ToBeSignedCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {id CertificateId,cracaId HashedId3,crlSeries CrlSeries,validityPeriod ValidityPeriod,region GeographicRegion OPTIONAL,assuranceLevel SubjectAssurance OPTIONAL,appPermissions SequenceOfPsidSsp OPTIONAL,certIssuePermissions SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions OPTIONAL,certRequestPermissions SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions OPTIONAL,canRequestRollover NULL OPTIONAL,encryptionKey PublicEncryptionKey OPTIONAL,verifyKeyIndicator VerificationKeyIndicator,...,flags BIT STRING {usesCubk (0)} (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL,appExtensions SequenceOfAppExtensions,certIssueExtensions SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions,certRequestExtension SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions}(WITH COMPONENTS { ..., appPermissions PRESENT} |WITH COMPONENTS { ..., certIssuePermissions PRESENT} |WITH COMPONENTS { ..., certRequestPermissions PRESENT})
This structure contains information that is used to identify the certificate holder if necessary.
@note Critical information fields:
Fields:
linkageData LinkageData
is used to identify the certificate for revocation
purposes in the case of certificates that appear on linked certificate
CRLs. See 5.1.3 and 7.3 for further discussion.
name Hostname
is used to identify the certificate holder in the case of
non-anonymous certificates. The contents of this field are a matter of
policy and are expected to be human-readable.
binaryId OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..64))
supports identifiers that are not human-readable.
none NULL
indicates that the certificate does not include an identifier.
CertificateId ::= CHOICE {linkageData LinkageData,name Hostname,binaryId OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..64)),none NULL,...}
This structure contains information that is matched against information obtained from a linkage ID-based CRL to determine whether the containing certificate has been revoked. See 5.1.3.4 and 7.3 for details of use.
Fields:
LinkageData ::= SEQUENCE {iCert IValue,linkage-value LinkageValue,group-linkage-value GroupLinkageValue OPTIONAL}
This type indicates which type of permissions may appear in end-entity certificates the chain of whose permissions passes through the PsidGroupPermissions field containing this value. If app is indicated, the end-entity certificate may contain an appPermissions field. If enroll is indicated, the end-entity certificate may contain a certRequestPermissions field.
This structure states the permissions that a certificate holder has with respect to issuing and requesting certificates for a particular set of PSIDs. For examples, see D.5.3 and D.5.4.
Fields:
subjectPermissions SubjectPermissions
indicates PSIDs and SSP Ranges covered by this
field.
minChainLength INTEGER DEFAULT 1
and chainLengthRange indicate how long the
certificate chain from this certificate to the end-entity certificate is
permitted to be. As specified in 5.1.2.1, the length of the certificate
chain is the number of certificates "below" this certificate in the chain,
down to and including the end-entity certificate. The length is permitted
to be (a) greater than or equal to minChainLength certificates and (b)
less than or equal to minChainLength + chainLengthRange certificates. A
value of 0 for minChainLength is not permitted when this type appears in
the certIssuePermissions field of a ToBeSignedCertificate; a certificate
that has a value of 0 for this field is invalid. The value -1 for
chainLengthRange is a special case: if the value of chainLengthRange is -1
it indicates that the certificate chain may be any length equal to or
greater than minChainLength. See the examples below for further discussion.
chainLengthRange INTEGER DEFAULT 0
eeType EndEntityType DEFAULT {app}
takes one or more of the values app and enroll and indicates
the type of certificates or requests that this instance of
PsidGroupPermissions in the certificate is entitled to authorize.
Different instances of PsidGroupPermissions within a ToBeSignedCertificate
may have different values for eeType.
PsidGroupPermissions ::= SEQUENCE {subjectPermissions SubjectPermissions,minChainLength INTEGER DEFAULT 1,chainLengthRange INTEGER DEFAULT 0,eeType EndEntityType DEFAULT {app}}
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions ::= SEQUENCE OF PsidGroupPermissions
This indicates the PSIDs and associated SSPs for which certificate issuance or request permissions are granted by a PsidGroupPermissions structure. If this takes the value explicit, the enclosing PsidGroupPermissions structure grants certificate issuance or request permissions for the indicated PSIDs and SSP Ranges. If this takes the value all, the enclosing PsidGroupPermissions structure grants certificate issuance or request permissions for all PSIDs not indicated by other PsidGroupPermissions in the same certIssuePermissions or certRequestPermissions field.
@note Critical information fields:
Fields:
SubjectPermissions ::= CHOICE {explicit SequenceOfPsidSspRange,all NULL,...}
The contents of this field depend on whether the certificate is an implicit or an explicit certificate.
@note Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.5. An implementation that does not recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.
@note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to the PublicVerificationKey and to the EccP256CurvePoint. The EccP256CurvePoint is encoded in compressed form, i.e., such that the choice indicated within the EccP256CurvePoint is compressed-y-0 or compressed-y-1.
Fields:
verificationKey PublicVerificationKey
is included in explicit certificates. It contains
the public key to be used to verify signatures generated by the holder of
the Certificate.
reconstructionValue EccP256CurvePoint
is included in implicit certificates. It
contains the reconstruction value, which is used to recover the public key
as specified in SEC 4 and 5.3.2.
VerificationKeyIndicator ::= CHOICE {verificationKey PublicVerificationKey,reconstructionValue EccP256CurvePoint,...}
This structure uses the parameterized type Extension to define an Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension as an open Extension Content field identified by an extension identifier. The extension identifier value is unique to extensions defined by ETSI and need not be unique among all extension identifier values defined by all contributing organizations.
This is an integer used to identify an Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension.
Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId ::= ExtId
p2pcd8ByteLearningRequestId Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId ::= 1
This is the ASN.1 Information Object Class that associates IEEE 1609 HeaderInfo contributed extensions with the appropriate Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId value.
Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensions EXT-TYPE ::= {{HashedId8 IDENTIFIED BY p2pcd8ByteLearningRequestId},...}
This structure contains any AppExtensions that apply to the certificate holder. As specified in 5.2.4.2.3, each individual AppExtension type is associated with consistency conditions, specific to that extension, that govern its consistency with SPDUs signed by the certificate holder and with the CertIssueExtensions in the CA certificates in that certificate holder’s chain. Those consistency conditions are specified for each individual AppExtension below.
SequenceOfAppExtensions ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF AppExtension
This structure contains an individual AppExtension. AppExtensions specified in this standard are drawn from the ASN.1 Information Object Set SetCertExtensions. This set, and its use in the AppExtension type, is structured so that each AppExtension is associated with a CertIssueExtension and a CertRequestExtension and all are identified by the same id value. In this structure:
Fields:
id CERT-EXT-TYPE .&id({SetCertExtensions})
identifies the extension type.
content CERT-EXT-TYPE .&App({SetCertExtensions}{@.id})
provides the content of the extension.
AppExtension ::= SEQUENCE {id CERT-EXT-TYPE.&id({SetCertExtensions}),content CERT-EXT-TYPE.&App({SetCertExtensions}{@.id})}
This field contains any CertIssueExtensions that apply to the certificate holder. As specified in 5.2.4.2.3, each individual CertIssueExtension type is associated with consistency conditions, specific to that extension, that govern its consistency with AppExtensions in certificates issued by the certificate holder and with the CertIssueExtensions in the CA certificates in that certificate holder’s chain. Those consistency conditions are specified for each individual CertIssueExtension below.
SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions ::=SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CertIssueExtension
This field contains an individual CertIssueExtension. CertIssueExtensions specified in this standard are drawn from the ASN.1 Information Object Set SetCertExtensions. This set, and its use in the CertIssueExtension type, is structured so that each CertIssueExtension is associated with a AppExtension and a CertRequestExtension and all are identified by the same id value. In this structure:
Fields:
id CERT-EXT-TYPE .&id({SetCertExtensions})
identifies the extension type.
permissions CHOICE {
specific CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Issue({SetCertExtensions}{@.id})
indicates the permissions. Within this field.
all NULL
CertIssueExtension ::= SEQUENCE {id CERT-EXT-TYPE.&id({SetCertExtensions}),permissions CHOICE {specific CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Issue({SetCertExtensions}{@.id}),all NULL}}
This field contains any CertRequestExtensions that apply to the certificate holder. As specified in 5.2.4.2.3, each individual CertRequestExtension type is associated with consistency conditions, specific to that extension, that govern its consistency with AppExtensions in certificates issued by the certificate holder and with the CertRequestExtensions in the CA certificates in that certificate holder’s chain. Those consistency conditions are specified for each individual CertRequestExtension below.
SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CertRequestExtension
This field contains an individual CertRequestExtension. CertRequestExtensions specified in this standard are drawn from the ASN.1 Information Object Set SetCertExtensions. This set, and its use in the CertRequestExtension type, is structured so that each CertRequestExtension is associated with a AppExtension and a CertRequestExtension and all are identified by the same id value. In this structure:
Fields:
id CERT-EXT-TYPE .&id({SetCertExtensions})
identifies the extension type.
permissions CHOICE {
content CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Req({SetCertExtensions}{@.id})
indicates the permissions. Within this field.
all NULL
CertRequestExtension ::= SEQUENCE {id CERT-EXT-TYPE.&id({SetCertExtensions}),permissions CHOICE {content CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Req({SetCertExtensions}{@.id}),all NULL}}
This type is the AppExtension used to identify an operating organization. The associated CertIssueExtension and CertRequestExtension are both of type OperatingOrganizationId. To determine consistency between this type and an SPDU, the SDEE specification for that SPDU is required to specify how the SPDU can be used to determine an OBJECT IDENTIFIER (for example, by including the full OBJECT IDENTIFIER in the SPDU, or by including a RELATIVE-OID with clear instructions about how a full OBJECT IDENTIFIER can be obtained from the RELATIVE-OID). The SPDU is then consistent with this type if the OBJECT IDENTIFIER determined from the SPDU is identical to the OBJECT IDENTIFIER contained in this field. This AppExtension does not have consistency conditions with a corresponding CertIssueExtension. It can appear in a certificate issued by any CA.
OperatingOrganizationId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
certExtId-OperatingOrganization ExtId ::= 1
instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions CERT-EXT-TYPE ::= {ID certExtId-OperatingOrganizationAPP OperatingOrganizationIdISSUE NULLREQUEST NULL}
This Information Object Set is a collection of Information Objects used to contain the AppExtension, CertIssueExtension, and CertRequestExtension types associated with a specific use of certificate extensions. In this version of this standard it only has a single entry instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions.
SetCertExtensions CERT-EXT-TYPE ::= {instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions,...}